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This paper considers some of the major issues involved in evaluating labour
market programs for Aboriginal people in the light of the extensive United
States (US) literature on the topic. The paper focuses on the US experience
under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), with some
reference to the Training for Aboriginals Program (TAP) in Australia. It
first considers the need for clearly stated objectives in the formulation of
labour market programs. It then outlines some of the problems faced by both
experimental and non-experimental evaluations of these programs. A wide
range of results has been reported on the effects on income of participation
in labour market programs in the US, and there is now considerable
scepticism concerning the value of non-experimental studies. The range of
results suggests that these need to be interpreted with caution, but strong
advocates for non-experimental techniques remain. The paper concludes by
presenting some of the implications of the US results for Australian policy
formulation and evaluation.
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The evaluation of labour market programs has received regular attention
in Australia following the growth in the number of participants in such
programs in the last twenty years.1 Aboriginal people are among the
disadvantaged groups who have received particular attention under these
programs.2 In real terms, Commonwealth expenditure on Aboriginal
education and training programs increased three-fold over the period
1979-80 to 1989-90 (Stretton and Chapman 1990).
The important issue is whether the money allocated to programs has been
spent effectively. In terms of public accountability, the Auditor General
presents reports to Parliament which assess the extent to which
government departments fulfil the standard requirements of accountability
for public funds. This is, of course, an important issue. This paper focuses
on another aspect of evaluation of labour market programs; namely, do
these achieve their stated objectives? The range of problems associated
with any evaluation of a labour market program is examined in the light
of the extensive American literature on this topic.
Indigenous minority groups in Australia and the United States (US) have
received funding through both mainstream labour market programs and
programs specifically designed for these groups. Expenditure by the
Australian Commonwealth Government on specific Aboriginal education
and training programs, administered by the Department of Employment,
Education and Training (DEBT), increased from zero in 1978-79 to 15
per cent of total expenditure on labour market programs in 1989-90
(Stretton and Chapman 1990). There has thus been a dramatic increase in
the share of funds earmarked specifically for Aborigines. In contrast,
over a similar time period, about 5 to 6 per cent of the US federal
expenditure on labour market programs was targeted at certain
disadvantaged groups, including Indians and Native Americans.3
The numbers participating in the major Aboriginal program, the Training
for Aboriginals Program (TAP), have fluctuated, but in the latest period
for which complete data are available, the 1990-91 financial year, almost
two-thirds of Aborigines participating in labour market programs were
included in TAP (Johnston 1991: 97). Special programs accounted for a
smaller proportion, about 50 per cent, of all Indians and Native
Americans assisted under US federal labour market programs. Although
it is very difficult to make cross-country comparisons, both the
expenditure and participation figures suggest that specific programs
directed towards indigenous minorities have been given greater emphasis
in Australia than in the US.
This paper focuses on the US experience under the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA), with some reference, by way of
comparison, with TAP in Australia. It first considers how the objectives
of the major Australian and US labour market programs have been stated
and then presents some of the problems faced in evaluating the effects of
participation in a program which assesses an individual's subsequent
position in the labour market. Some results of evaluations in the US are
also presented. The paper concludes by considering some of the lessons
from the US experience for the evaluation of labour market programs for
Aborigines in Australia. A brief outline of the principal components of
CETA and the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) and TAP is presented
in the Appendix.
Stating the objectives
Ideally, any government program should have clearly stated objectives by
which it can be evaluated. The Aboriginal Employment Development
Policy (AEDP), of which TAP is a part, is an example of a program with
such objectives (Australian Government 1987). The goals of statistical
employment and income equality are clearly stated in the AEDP policy
statement (Sanders 1991).
The output of most Australian labour market programs has been
measured in terms of the employment status of the participants. However,
the objectives have not always been clear. One of die issues discussed in
Johnston's (1991) review of TAP was the lack of clarity in the program's
objectives. Some sections of the guidelines suggest that employment
generation is the major objective of the program, while other sections
suggest that providing training opportunities for Aboriginal people is the
primary goal (Johnston 1991: 27). Any measurement of the success of the
program will depend on the weight given to each of these objectives.
However, for an evaluation of the effectiveness of the program, there is a
further issue which must be considered. Even if training is the primary
function of the program, a measure of training opportunities provided is
not an adequate measure of the program's output, as what needs to be
measured is the long-term effect of training on an individual's
employment and income status. Training opportunities are merely an
intermediate step towards improving a person's economic status.
In addition to the use of employment status as a measure of the output of
labour market programs, the American programs have used income
indicators. The purpose of CETA, the major federal program during the
period 1973-1982, was defined in the Act as providing:
job training and employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged,
unemployed, or underemployed persons which will result in an increase in their
earned income, and to assure that training and other services lead to maximum
employment opportunities and self-enhancement (Gay and Borus 1980: 29).
The JTPA, which replaced CETA in 1982, also measured the success of
the programs with both income and employment indicators. (See
Appendix for a description of the major programs funded under CETA
and JTPA).
There is a strong case for using both income and employment indicators
to measure the outcome of a labour market program. The rationale for
providing people with additional labour market training is based on the
assumption that such training is expected to increase their probability of
employment by providing them with skills which both enhance their
productivity and are of value in the labour market. However, the benefits
of training should be reflected in earnings as well as employment. In fact,
employment status may be misleading as to the effect of training on an
individual's labour market performance. An extreme hypothetical
example illustrates this: A labourer becomes unemployed and goes on a
program training as a computer programmer. Three months after
completing the course he is asked about his employment status. He is now
employed as a labourer. This would be measured as a successful training
outcome if employment status were the only indicator used, but the result
is probably unrelated to the training. In fact, he may be worse off due to
the earnings foregone as a labourer while training to be a computer
programmer.
A further example, which demonstrates that employment status alone may
be a misleading indicator of the impact of participation in a training
program, can be developed in the context of current Aboriginal labour
market policy. If an unemployed Aborigine receives training under TAP
and then gains employment under the Community Development
Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme, this employment would be counted
as a successful outcome of training.4 If the training provides an important
input into community projects, the outcome should be measured as a
success. However, employment under the CDEP scheme falls outside of
the mainstream labour market. Individuals are employed under the
scheme by virtue of belonging to an Aboriginal community, not
necessarily because of the skills they have acquired through training.
Employment status will therefore be unaffected by skill acquisition, and
the TAP training may provide little benefit to the trainee or the
community. Furthermore, as CDEP scheme workers are paid the near
equivalent of their welfare entitlement, the income of former TAP
participants need not reflect the full benefit that the community receives
from their training. Additional information beyond employment status,
e.g. occupation status, is required to assess whether the training has been
useful.
The problems of evaluation
Once the objectives of any labour market program have been stated, the
next step is to evaluate the success of the program in achieving these
objectives. The major question posed in any evaluation of employment
and training programs is what would have happened to an individual's
employment status and earnings in the absence of the program. Even
without participation in a labour market program, an unemployed person
may eventually find a job, and perhaps even one with higher earnings.
Therefore, there is a problem in determining which, if any, part of an
increase in earnings can be attributed to participation in a program.
Comparison groups can be established using either experimental or non-
experimental methods.
In Australia, the use of a control or comparison group, with which to
compare the outcomes for program participants, has been limited.
Certainly, in the recent review of TAP (Johnston 1991), there was no
attempt to compare the outcomes for TAP participants with those of non-
participants. For the labour market programs administered by DEET,
'positive outcomes', including both employment and participation in
further training, are the major measures used of the output of the
programs. These data are collected from the Post Program Monitoring
(PPM) postal survey of participants, undertaken three months after the
completion of a program. A summary of the results of these surveys until
December 1990 was presented in a quarterly monitoring report. Since
then, the results have only been available in internal DEET reports. There
have been more detailed evaluations of specific DEET programs, although
the results are not always publicly available. (See Stretton and Chapman
(1990) for a recent survey of these.)
In the US, it was a requirement under CETA that the programs be
evaluated, particularly with respect to their effect on earnings, but also
with reference to other indicators. It would appear that the criteria used
by the Department of Labor were similar to some of those applied by
DEET in quarterly monitoring reports. Gay and Borus (1980) listed eight
indicators used by the Department of Labor, based on program placement
rates within three months of the completion of a program:
i Percentage of those leaving CETA programs for employment.
ii Percentage of terminees with a positive outcome (including
employment, school, military or another CETA program).
iii Percentage of total positive terminees entering employment.
iv Percentage entering employment after receiving more than minimal
CETA services.5
v Percentage of terminees who receive more than minimum CETA
services.
vi Program cost per person entering employment,
vii Cost per positive termination.
viii Cost per person placed after receiving more than minimum CETA
services.
The Gay and Borus (1980) study tested whether these eight performance
indicators correlated with longer-term success in the labour market, using
data from earlier programs operating during the period 1969-72. They
used longitudinal data on program participants collected at four
interviews: the first was held a week after program entry; the second at
the time of program exit; the third, four months later; and the final
interview one year after exit. These data were linked with earnings data
for 1973 from the Social Security Administration. The long-term success
of the program was measured by assessing earnings 18 months to three
years after the completion of the program. A control group was selected,
by screening more than 50,000 households in low income areas in ten
cities, to locate a sample of persons eligible to enter these programs who
had not done so. Individuals were included in the control group to match
participants on the basis of age, race, city and, where possible,
neighbourhood.
The study concluded that training had a larger positive effect on earnings
for women and minority groups than for white men. The authors also
argued that ' ... based on our findings for the four types of programs
studied here, it appears that placement in a job within three months after
leaving a program is among the poorest performance indicators' (Gay and
Borus, 1980: 42). They found that the most reliable indicators of long-
term income gains were changes in weeks worked, wage rates and
earnings.
Several reasons were suggested for this result. Firstly, placement alone
does not provide information on the type of job. More detailed
information on weeks worked, earnings and other job attributes are
needed to provide a real indication of the nature of the work and,
therefore, the level of earnings in the longer run. It is also possible that
those who find work quickly after the completion of a program have
searched the job market less effectively, and do not utilise their newly-
acquired skills as fully in their new jobs as those who take longer to find
work. The result that simple measures of outcomes, in the period
immediately following participation in a labour market program, are
unreliable indicators of longer-term success suggests that caution is
needed in accepting similar measures used by DEBT as the sole criteria
for measuring the success of programs.
Non-experimental evaluation
One method used to answer the counterfactual question of the effect of
programs is a comparison of outcomes for those participating in the
program with a control group of non-participants. In the absence of a true
experiment in which individuals are randomly assigned to a program or a
control group, non-experimental data have been used to construct a
control group. This raises a number of important methodological issues.
The results of any evaluation of a training program have been shown to
be highly dependent on the choice of control group.
In the 1970s, considerable effort was directed towards the collection of
data for the evaluation of CETA programs by non-experimental methods.
The Department of Labor established the Continuous Longitudinal
Manpower Survey (CLMS) which contained records from an annual
sample of individuals commencing CETA programs. Information on
labour market experience over a four-year period commencing one year
prior to CETA enrolment, the type of CETA program in which the
individual had participated, basic demographic characteristics, a history of
public benefits received by the individual and his or her family, and
family-related variables, were included (Bassi 1983). For comparative
purposes, a cross-section sample from the Current Population Survey
(CPS), which covers the whole of the US population, was also included.
These data were further augmented by annual earnings data reported by
these individuals to the Social Security Administration from 1951.
The CLMS database was managed by a private company, and it formed
the basis for many studies of the impact of CETA (Barnow 1987). Some
researchers were critical of the methods used to select the control group
from the CPS and returned to the original data source to establish a
comparison group.6 The choice of control group has important
implications for the estimated impact of CETA programs on earnings and
a wide range of estimates has been produced (see discussion below).
A related issue in selecting a non-experimental control group is the
problem of 'contamination' bias. If the control group is selected from a
general survey of the population, such as CPS, some of those included in
the control may have received training under the program being evaluated
without the researcher being able to identify this. In Bassi's (1983) study,
based on 1976 data, she reported that only 0.8 per cent of the total
population participated in CETA. If a random sample were selected from
CPS, it would be expected to include only a small number of CETA
participants. However, if the comparison group were selected to match the
characteristics of known participants, this group could be expected to
include a larger proportion of program participants than in one selected
from the general population. These individuals could not be identified by
the researcher. Bassi estimated that between 4 and 5 per cent of the
individuals in the control group were enrolled in CETA during 1976. If
program participation has a positive effect on earnings, the inclusion of
this group in the control group would reduce the estimated effect of
training.
Another issue that has been the subject of considerable discussion in the
literature on non-experimental evaluation is the problem of selectivity
bias.7 The individuals who participate in these programs are not randomly
selected from the population and are likely to vary from non-participants
in a systematic manner. It is possible that only the more highly motivated
among the unemployed agree to engage in training. Similarly, the
program administrators, with their need for positive outcomes in mind,
may only select participants for programs most likely to succeed in the
labour market under any circumstances. If either of these two factors
were important, to attribute any post-program increase in earnings to the
participation in the program would be to overestimate the effects of
training on earnings. Alternatively, these programs may attract the least
motivated members of the unemployed; those who do not expect to find a
job independently and therefore face a low opportunity cost of
participating in training. The US evidence, presented in these studies,
shows that CETA participants were disadvantaged compared with non-
participants of similar age, sex and race in the population at large. If
CETA participants were, on average, less motivated and able than similar
individuals in the population, the effects of training on earnings, without a
correction for selectivity bias, would underestimate the benefits of
training. Many studies evaluating CETA have included a correction for
selectivity bias, but the problem of a wide range of estimates of the effect
of these programs remains.8
The results of the evaluation exercise have also proved to be sensitive to
the choice of year as the pre-program benchmark for earnings. Trainees
have typically experienced a decline in their earnings, both absolutely and
relative to any comparison group selected, in the period immediately
prior to training.' (Ashenfelter and Card 1985: 648). This is perhaps not
surprising as CETA was formulated to target disadvantaged groups, but
the question remains as to whether this decline typically represents a
permanent or transitory change in earnings. The answer to this question
has implications for the choice of the pre-program benchmark year. If an
individual becomes unemployed due to some temporary factor, for
example the bankruptcy of an employer, earnings immediately prior to
commencement of training may be temporarily depressed and thus not
represent longer-term earnings potential in the absence of training. If
earnings at the temporary low pre-training level are taken as the
benchmark for comparison with post-training earnings, the effect of
training on earnings will be overestimated. The immediate pre-training
earnings, however, may represent a good estimate of the employee's
likely earnings in the future. This situation may arise, for example, when
a person's skills have become obsolete and new skills are needed to
compete in the labour market. In general, researchers have found that
estimates of the impact of CETA on earnings are very sensitive to the
choice of benchmark year and tend to show larger effects of training the
closer the benchmark is to the time of training.9
At the other end of the process, there is the question of the appropriate
time to evaluate the effect of the programs on earnings. Some results
suggest a large initial impact of program participation on earnings
followed by a declining effect, while others suggest that the longer-term
effect exceeds the impact effect.10 These results show that programs need
to be evaluated at more than one point in time.
In summary, there are numerous problems associated with non-
experimental estimates of the impact of training on earnings, and
assessments of the usefulness of these techniques tend to be pessimistic.
There is strong support for the view that programs, such as CETA, can
only be evaluated by conducting methodologically rigorous social
experiments. Ashenfelter and Card (1985: 659), for example, concluded
that 'the sensitivity of the non-experimental results ... leads us to conclude
that for the evaluation of training programs experimental tests using
random assignment are especially desirable'.
The debate on the usefulness of non-experimental evaluation remains
inconclusive. Heckman and others have argued that the problem lies more
with the appropriate choice of model for non-experimental evaluation,
rather than with the technique itself:
The recent negative assessments of nonexperimental methods have created a mood
of unwarranted pessimism. The available assessments of nonexperimental methods
confuse rather than clarify matters ... The wide range of estimates produced from
their studies simply illustrate that false models produce poor estimates and different
false models produce different poor estimates. Missing from their studies is any
serious attempt to test the validity of the assumptions maintained in the alternative
models (Heckman, Hotz and Dabos 1987: 424).
Non-experimental methods may, in principle, produce accurate
assessments of the impact of labour market programs, but, at the very
least, the range of estimates produced by these techniques suggests that
people using these estimates need very detailed knowledge of the methods
used to construct them.
Experimental evaluation
A frequent conclusion of the US literature is that for an accurate
evaluation of labour market programs, such as CETA, classical
experiments with random assignment of individuals to a program or
control group is required. 'The principle advantage of experimentation
over ... non-experimental analysis is that it allows the effects of a given
policy intervention to be estimated without bias and measured with a
known degree of statistical precision' (Burtless and Orr 1986: 609). This
conclusion has been accepted by US policy-makers. Evaluation under
JTPA has been conducted using experimental techniques (Riddell 1991:
50).
LaLonde (1986) compared estimates, gained by means of experiment
using randomly assigned workers, of the impact on earnings of the
National Supported Work Program (a temporary employment program
for disadvantaged workers), with results using non-experimental estimates
of the impact of the program. He concludes that:
many of the econometric procedures and comparison groups used to evaluate
employment and training programs would not have yielded accurate or precise
estimates of the impact of the National Supported Work Program. The econometric
estimates often differ significantly from the experimental results. Moreover, even
when the econometric estimates pass conventional specification tests, they still fail
to replicate the experimentally determined results (LaLonde 1986: 617).
This finding was replicated by Fraker and Maynard (1987) in a similar
study of the same program.11
Burtless and Orr (1986) provide an interesting discussion of the criticisms
levelled against experimentation. They suggest that the most widely held
criticism is based on the ethical argument that people should not be denied
access to programs which may benefit them. This view appears to
dominate the Australian debate, and there has been resistance to the
suggestion of any form of experimental evaluation. For example:
Random assignment has not been applied in evaluation work in Australia because
government objectives of equal opportunity and equity of access to assistance mean
that eligible applicants cannot be denied assistance on a random basis. Some
rationing according to predetermined priorities may occur, but this rationing
primarily involves restriction of access to a specific target group. Members of the
target group are not denied the opportunity to participate (DEET 1991: 143).
Against this view, Burtless and Orr (1986) argue that so long as
participation in the experiment is subject to a number of conditions, there
seems little to object to on ethical grounds. These conditions include the
following: participation is voluntary; participants are fully informed
about the nature of the experiment; and those randomly selected into the
control group are compensated, preferably by lump sum payments, for
the loss of potentially beneficial services. This is a rather long list of
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conditions to attach to the acceptability of the experiments. Voluntary
inclusion in the experiment would leave the problem of selectivity bias
unresolved. There is also the problem of deciding the appropriate
compensation for those in the control group prior to the evaluation of the
program.
Other criticisms raised against experiments relate to the extent to which
experimental results can be replicated on larger numbers of individuals,
for example the whole population, or in other environments. If
participation in a program changes an individual's position in the job
queue so that participants gain at the expense of non-participants, then the
expansion of the program may remove this 'benefit1. An experiment
would provide useful information about the operation of a program in a
particular set of labour market conditions in a particular location, but the
results may offer little guidance about the success of the same program
under different conditions. It is also possible that people behave
differently when they know they are participating in an experiment than
if they are in a 'real' situation.
The major disadvantage, cited by Burtless and Orr (1986), of
experimental evaluation of labour market programs is their cost. The
costs of the experiments undertaken in the US have totalled millions of
dollars. However, it is important to remember that the expenditure on the
programs themselves has amounted to billions of dollars.
The use of experiments to evaluate programs would not, of course,
eliminate all problems. The problems of choosing a pre-training
benchmark and the appropriate point for post-training evaluation remain.
Non-response bias is always expensive to reduce. A further general
consideration relating to all evaluation methods is the time involved. It
may take four or five years to collect the data needed to undertake an
evaluation, and with die additional time necessary for analysis and
publication of results, it may be six or seven years before results are
widely available. This sort of time-frame is unlikely to be politically
acceptable, especially given the potential brevity of Australian political
cycles, and given the substantial changes which can take place in an
economy over such a period, the results may be of little help to the
policy-makers in the short run.
Results of evaluations of labour market programs
In a survey article of CLMS-based studies of the impact of CETA on
earnings, Barnow (1987: 159) concluded that 'it is difficult to draw strong
conclusions about how effective the CETA programs were at increasing
the earnings of participants'. Estimates ranged from a negative effect on
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earnings12 to substantial positive effects13- depending on assumptions and
the specifications of the regression model used. LaLonde and Maynard
(1987: 430) note with respect to CETA evaluations that 'the estimates of
earnings gains for women range from under $400 to over $2,000 per
year; those for men range from an increase of over $2,000 to a decrease
of over $3,000 per year; and the estimates for youth range from nearly a
$1,000 increase to a $1,900 decrease in earnings per year.'
Although the estimated impact on earnings of participation in CETA
varied between studies, some generalisations were apparent. Riddell
(1991: 59) summarised the findings as follows:
Women are generally found to benefit more from training than men. In terms of the
different services offered by the programme, public service employment and on-the-
job training generally had Ac highest estimated impacts, and classroom training and
work experience the lowest.
I have not read any results of evaluation studies on American Indians and
Natives, but propose to investigate this in forthcoming research.
In Australia, there have been few evaluations of labour market programs,
and those which have been undertaken have generally been carried out
from within the public service, rather than by independent academic
researchers. There has been very limited use of a control group with
which to compare the outcomes of participants. Outcomes have been
measured in terms of employment status rather than income. In their
discussion of Australian labour market programs, Stretton and Chapman
(1990: 49) argue that the evidence suggests that wage subsidy schemes are
the most successful in assisting the unemployed, followed by training
programs and finally direct job creation schemes.
One non-experimental estimate of the impact of participation in a labour
market program on the probability of employment for Aborigines is
presented by Ross (1991). Ross conducted a survey of Aboriginal
employment in five Aboriginal Land Council regions in New South
Wales.14 He found that for a given age, marital status, years of schooling,
area of residence, years of work experience and level of other income,
participation in a labour market program had a highly positive and
significant impact on the probability of employment. These results were
very dramatic: for example, for unemployed Aboriginal men
participation in a labour market program was estimated to increase the
probability of employment by 29 percentage points. Further investigation
is required, as these estimates are based on a small number of
observations. In addition, as estimating the impact of labour market
programs on Aboriginal employment was not the main focus of Ross's
analysis, he did not attempt to make any allowance for selectivity bias in
the sample. Those who had participated in these programs may differ in
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some unmeasured but sytematic way from those who did not. This has not
been taken into account in the estimates.
Table 1. The employment status of TAP participants three
months after finishing training, 1983-84 and 1990-91 (per
cent).
1983-84 4 April 1990- 26 May 1992*
Total Community Private
TAP* employer employer
ASP A31d A30P A31d
In:
Subsidised empl.e 12.2 9.2 26.7 11.8 29.1
Unsubsidised empl.f 30.7 48.5 29.1 39.8 20.1
Total employment 42.9 57.7 55.8 51.6 49.2
Total unemployment 48.8 36.4 36.5 39.5 41.8
Not in the labour force 8.3 5.8 7.8 8.9 9.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a. The choice of dates was not explained in Johnston (1991). The raw numbers on
which the figures were based were not presented in Johntson's table, so it was not
possible to calculate the figures for the whole of TAP. Table 6.3 of Johnston shows that
in 1990-91, about two-thirds of placements were in the private sector and one third in the
community sector. This breakdown may not,however, apply to those completing the
post program monitoring questionnaire.
b. A further breakdown of these figures by type of program is presented in Miller
(1985), but the categories used make comparisons of sub-programs between the two
periods difficult.
c. A30 placements provided on-the-job training with employers. (See Appendix.)
d. A31 placements provided fully subsidised short-term work experience. (See
Appendix.)
e. Subsidised employment included employment in all programs subsidised by DEET.
Any employment subsidised by agencies other than DEET was included in the
unsubsidised employment included all employment where direct subsidies were not paid
to employers by DEET. CDEP employment, for example, was included in this category
and may differ in some unmeasured but systematic way from those who did not. This has
not been taken into account in the estimates.
Source: Miller (1985: 152-3); and Johnston (1991:94).
Table 1 presents some summary data for TAP taken from the Miller and
Johnston Reports. The data are taken from the Post Program Monitoring
Survey conducted by DEET and therefore only refer to the outcomes for
the 57 per cent of Aboriginal participants who answered the postal
questionnaire. The table shows that the percentage of respondents who
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were unemployed three months after the completion of a program had
decreased between 1983-84 and 1990-91, but the percentage in subsidised
employment had probably increased. The figures, however, offer no
guide to how a comparable group of non-participants fared in the labour
market over the same period. It is therefore not possible to assess the
effectiveness of TAP in promoting Aboriginal employment from these
data.
Summary and conclusion
hi Australia, $527.7 million was spent in total on labour market programs
by the Commonwealth Government in 1989-90. $78.5 million of this was
spent on special training and education programs for Aborigines.15 It is
important to have some idea of the benefits gained from this expenditure.
A review of the US literature shows that there are no easy solutions to the
problem of how to evaluate the effects of employment and training
programs. The general conclusion of American studies is in favour of
experimental, rather than non-experimental, evaluation. Certainly, if non-
experimental evaluation techniques are adopted, it is very important that
the assumptions underlying the choice of control group and econometric
model are clearly spelt out and that some sort of sensitivity analysis is
undertaken.
The issues raised in this paper have a number of implications for
Australian Aboriginal employment and training policy. If a serious
attempt is to be made to evaluate labour market programs, then a range of
measures of outcomes should be used. For example, both employment
status and income status must be gauged, and surveys must be repeated.
The recent review of TAP focused on administrative issues and did not
attempt to rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of the program. The
evidence that was presented on effectiveness was either anecdotal or based
on PPM data, with no results presented for a control group. The
effectiveness of TAP needs to be evaluated more rigorously.
TAP is currently being divided into a private sector employment and
training program administered by DEBT and a community sector
program administered by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission. Standard indicators of success, such as the employment
status and income of participants, are relevant in an evaluation of the TAP
private sector program. But given the likely additional goal of
'community development' under the TAP community sector program, the
appropriateness of these indicators used in isolation is limited. Any
evaluation of community-based training will need to consider the effects
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of this training on the broader goals of 'community development'.
Judgements on such issues are likely to be extremely subjective, and there
is a danger that any outcomes can be justified as optimal. There needs to
be considerable clarification of the term 'community development' and
subsequent assessment of its success or failure in relation to specified
criteria.
The Australian Longitudinal Survey (ALS) provides information on
participation in employment and training programs for young people, but
there is no Australian data source which covers longitudinal data for the
whole of the Australian population. In principle, this survey could be
used, using non-experimental techniques, to compare labour market
outcomes for participants and non-participants. There is an Aboriginal
identifier in the ALS, but the sample is very small, and it would be
difficult to generalise the results.
Following the recommendations of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal
Deaths in Custody, a national survey of the economic and social status of
the Aboriginal population is to be undertaken (Commonwealth of
Australia 1992). One issue which could be raised concerns participation in
labour market programs. This would provide a basis for a limited non-
experimental evaluation of the effects of labour market programs by
comparing outcomes for participants and non-participants, making
appropriate allowances for selectivity bias. This would be necessary, as
participation in a labour market program is not based on random
allocation. However, a one-off survey of the Aboriginal population would
not provide all the information necessary to evaluate the impact of
participation in a program on labour market performance; longitudinal
data are therefore essential (Daly 1992).
The American experience shows that it is possible for government
departments to cooperate in the formation of a data set useful for research
purposes. Although the data collected for administrative purposes were
not ideal for the evaluation of CETA, they provided a starting point.
There are a number of problems that would need to be overcome in
combining data from different Australian Government agencies. These
include: the standardisation of the geographical, administrative and
program delivery divisions of the country used by various departments
and agencies; and for those interested in Aboriginal policy, the
standardisation of definitions of Aboriginality used.
At a political level, more consideration needs to be directed towards the
establishment of experiments to evaluate the effects of labour market
programs in Australia. Such experiments are expensive, but given the
emphasis placed on training in government policy, it is important to
determine if its assumed beneficial effects are in fact real.
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Notes
1. Among the recent reviews of labour market programs are the Kirby Report (1985),
Stretton and Chapman (1990) and Sloan (1991). Miller (1985) and Johnston (1991)
look specifically at Aboriginal participation in these programs.
2. The terms 'Aboriginal' and 'Aborigines' refer to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander populations throughoutthis discussion paper.
3. The disadvantaged groups covered by these programs included Indians and Native
Americans, migrant and seasonal farm workers, ex-offenders, older workers and
the handicapped (see Appendix). It is not a major focus of this paper to examine the
position of Indians and Native Americans in US labour market programs. It is
proposed to consider this in greater detail in further research.
4. For a description of the scheme see Sanders (1988), Altman and Sanders (1991)
and Morony (1991).
5. The term 'minimal1 was not defined by Gay and Borus (1980).
6. See for example, Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Dickinson, Johnson and West
(1986). There are many technical issues concerning the most appropriate way to
select the control group. This will not be pursued here. A further important
technical question is the appropriate specification of the regression equations used
to estimate the effect of training on earnings. Interested readers are directed to the
original studies.
7. For a technical discussion of the issue of selectivity bias see Heckman (1979) and
Heckman and Robb (1986).
8. See, for example, Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and LaLonde (1986).
9. See Ashenfelter (1978), Ashentfelter and Card (1985) and Bassi (1983).
10. See, for example, Ashenfelter (1978) and Bassi (1983).
11. For a report of the results of another American experimental program see
Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987).
12. See, for example, Dickinson, Johnson and West (1986). The authors explained this
negative result in terms of CETA diverting participants from productive job search
or employer discrimination against CETA participants. They argued that individuals
may have continued to enrol in CETA despite those estimated detrimental effects on
earnings due to the short-term benefits of the payments made to trainees and those
in public sector employment under CETA.
13. See, for example, Bassi (1983).
14. These Regions are jurisdictions created by the NSW Aboriginal Land Rights Act
1983.
15. See Stretton and Chapman (1990).
Appendix
Labour market programs in the US have been federally funded since the 1960s under
three pieces of legislation, covering 1982 to the present: the Manpower Development and
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Training Act (MOTA), 1962-73; the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA), 1973-82; and the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). In contrast,Australian
labour market programs have not been established by legislation. This appendix provides
a brief outline of the activities under CETA and JTPA in the US and TAP in Australia.
CETA, 1973-82
Responsibility for training at the federal level was concentrated in one organisation but
programs were actually operated by prime sponsors, usually State or local governments,
with:
wide discretion with regard to program design. The range of devices provided
includes classroom and on-the-job training, basic and remedial education, testing,
job referral and development, work experience, and supportive social services.
Sponsors may provide these services directly or indirectly through contracts or
subgrants with such organisations as State Employment Security Agencies
(SESAs), vocational agencies, schools, community groups, labor organisations, or
private businesses. Prime sponsors are responsible for monitoring andevaluating
programs to determine that local needs are met (Employment and Training Report of
the President 1980: 24).
CETA was amended several times. This outline relates to CETA after the amendmentsof
1978 which strengthened the focus of the Act on the economically disadvantaged.
According to the 1982 Employment and Training Report of the President, 97 per cent of
participants were 'disadvantaged' in the sense that they or their families received cash
welfare payments, or the family had a total income estimated on an annual basis to be
below the official poverty line set by the Office of Management and Budget for their
family size and location (Employment and Training Report of the President 1982: 29).
The major functions of the Act, apart from the administrative functions covered under
Tides I and V, can be summarised as follows:
i Title II: Comprehensive Employment and Training Services. This title authorised
classroom-based and on-the-job training, work experience and job-search assistance
under titles IIB and C. Under title IID, people who had been unemployed for 15 of
the last 20 weeks, or who were in a family receiving welfare benefits could join a
public service employmentprogram.
ii Title HI: Special National Programs and Activities. This title covered programs for
special target groups, such as Indians and other Native Americans, migrants and
seasonal workers, ex-offenders, older workers, women and the handicapped.
iii Title IV: Youth Programs. This title covered classroom-based and on-the-job
training for young people.
iv Title VII: Public Service Employment Program. This title authorised a
countercyclical public service employment program.
v Title VII: Private Sector Initiative Program. Private Industry Councils were
established with representatives from industry,organised labour, community-based
organisations and educational institutions to improve the access of CETA
participants to the private sector.
vi Title VIII: Young Adult Conservation Corps. Young people aged 16-23 years were
organised for conservation work in national parks and other public land.
JTPA, 1982
The Act has been amended since, but under the original provisions there were five Tides,
four of which were employment and training program titles:
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i Tide I: Job Training Partnership. Established state and local delivery services and
the Private Industry Councils to plan training and employment programs at the local
level.
ii Title II: Training for the disadvantage^
iii Tide III: Employment and training assistance for dislocated workers.
iv Title IV: Federally administrated programs. Included a range of programs for
special groups such as Indians and Nadve Americans, migrants and seasonal
workers.
The legislation aimed to promote die role of die private sector and abolished public sector
job creation. A system of standards was created to measure program performance in terms
of participants' increased employment and earnings and reduction in welfare dependency.
For Indians and Native Americans, for example, diere were diree performance indicators:
the proportion entering employment; positive terminations; and die cost per positive
termination. The organisations running die programs were expected to meet particular
targets on these three measures (US Department of Labor (1988:14). For further
discussion see the Department of Labor (various years) and Guttman (1983).
TAP
TAP was established in 1980-81. Under die original scheme, assistance was provided to
Aborigines in the form of wage subsidies for on-die-job training in die public sector,
wage subsidies for on-the-job training and work experience in the private sector,
assistance for participating in training courses and additional assistance, such as
allowances for living away from home (Miller 1985:97).
The basic idea of providing subsidised training, eidier on-the-job or formally, has
persisted throughout the duration of the scheme, but there have been changes in the
direction these programs have taken. The oudine presented here focuses on the major
elements of die program as reviewed by Johnston. Following diis review, tiiere have been
changes in die operation of die program. At die time of writing, many of Johnston's
recommendations are still being considered, but his major recommendation that the
administration of die community sector program be transferred to the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) from DEBT is currentiy being implemented.
The objectives of die TAP scheme, as set out in DEBT (1991b: 89), were to:
achieve employment equity for Aboriginal people and contributeto die promotion of
Aboriginal economic independence by increasing permanent employment
opportunities for Aboriginal people in all occupations and at all levels of the
mainstream labour market; and by generating employment and economic
development opportunities for Aboriginal people living in communities in rural and
remote areas where there are few or no mainstream labour and economic markets.
Assistance was provided under die following headings:
i AZO: The major employment strategy provides subsidies to large employers, both
public and private sector, to develop employment strategies for Aborigines.
ii A30: Jobs skills development provides a subsidy of between 25 and 100 per cent
for up to a year to employers who provide employment and training. It is a
requirement that die placement is likely to result in a permanent job.
iii A31: Work experience offers employers a 100 per cent subsidy for providing work
experience for up to three montiis for Aboriginal people, usually women and youth,
newly entering the labour force. These positions need not be permanent.
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iv A34: Aboriginal Employment Action encourages the appointment of Aboriginal
employment development officers with employers who employ one thousand or
more employees). This is sometimes used in conjunction with A20.
v A40: Skills training aims to develop skills relevant to the economic development of
Aboriginal communities.
vi A41: Information and preparation provides training to the staff of Aboriginal
community and service organisations.
vii A42: Enterprise Employment Assistance (EEA) is a community-based program
which provides wage subsidies equivalent to the welfare entitlement of the
employee, for new Aboriginal employees.
viii A44: Aboriginal Enterprise Incentive Scheme (AEIS) offers small 'soft' loans to
enterprises established by unemployed Aborigines or CDEP participants.
ix ASO: Work preparation covers course costs and income support duringparticipation
in formal courses with an accredited on-the-job training component
x A54: Formal course development provides support for apprenticeships and
management training in a formal environment
It should be noted that following the Johnston Report, all community sector elements of
JAP were transferred to ATS 1C. As from 1 July 1992, TAP (community sector) became
the Community Training Program administered by ATSIC and TAP (private sector)
remained with DEET.
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